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Commercial Law-Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Investment Company Institute: The Continuing
Conflict Between Commercial and Investment Banking
In 1972 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB)
amended Regulation Y,I thereby allowing bank holding companies to serve as
investment advisors to closed-end 2 investment companies. 3 Although this action granted bank holding companies access to only a very narrow range of
investment banking functions, 4 it nevertheless caused investment bankers to
"circle up the wagons" and fight for their territory.5 The reaction illustrated
1. Regulation Y is codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.1-225.142 (1982). The Federal Reserve
Board promulgated Regulation Y to facilitate performance of the duties assigned to it in the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Regulation Y is
authorized at 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1976): "The Board is authorized to issue such regulations and
orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this chapter
and prevent evasions thereof."
2. The primary difference between a closed-end investment company and an open-end investment company (i.e., mutual funds) is the degree of involvement in the issuance and redemption of fund shares. Typically, an open-end investment company continually issues new shares
and stands ready to redeem outstanding shares on request. After its initial organization, a closedend investment company issues shares at infrequent intervals, if at all, and does not stand ready to
redeem these shares on request. Due to these limitations, shares of many closed-end investment
companies are traded on the stock market. R. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 187-88 (1978).
3. Effective February 1, 1972, the Board of Governors amended § 225.4(a) of Regulation Y to add "serving as an investment advisor, as defined in section 2(a)(20) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, to an investment company registered under that Act"
to the list of activities it has determined to be so closely related to banking or managing
or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.
12 C.F.R. § 225.125(a) (1982).
Proceedings held during the FRB's consideration of the amendment raised several questions
about the broad scope of the investment advisory function in light of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-378 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the Supreme Court decision in Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Subsequently, the FRB released an interpretive ruling, 12
C.F.R. § 225.125 (1982), that narrowed the scope of permissible activities. The interpretive ruling
forbids bank holding companies from: (1) sponsoring, organizing, or controlling an open-end
investment company, (2) acting as an investment advisor to an investment company that can be
identified with the bank holding company or its bank subsidiaries by its name or location; (3)
purchasing securities of the investment company being advised for the holding company's own
account, or, under the bank holding company's sole discretion, for the accounts for which the
bank acts as fiduciary or managing agent; (4) extending credit to the investment company being
advised, or accepting the investment company's securities as collateral for a loan that is being used
for the purpose of purchasing the investment company's securities; (5) engaging directly or indirectly in the sale or distribution of the investment company's securities; and (6) investing the cash
funds of the investment company in time deposit or certificate of deposit accounts of any bank
affiliate. Id
4. Investment funds are just one aspect of the securities underwriting and trading activities
in which investment banking companies engage. In its interpretive ruling, the FRB further limited the scope of bank holding company involvement in such activities to the organization, operation, and control of closed-end investment companies. See supra note 1. A closed-end investment
company does not generally trade its securities after the initial organization and issuance of
shares. See supra note 2.
5. The investment banking industry has shown a willingness to challenge commercial bank
intrusion into what have traditionally been investment banking activities. During the last two
decades the industry has initiated litigation no fewer than four times, with varying degrees of
success. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46
(1981) (1972 amendment to Regulation Y, defining "investment advising" as an activity "closely
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once again that a major concern of the investment banking community is the
erosion of the protective barrier provided by the Glass-Steagall Act and the6
subsequent influx of commercial banks into the investment banking industry.
The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the FRB's amendment in Boardof
Governorsof the FederalReserve System v. Investment Company Institute (FRB
v. IC) 7 further erodes the protection provided to investment bankers. The
decision, however, may have a much broader scope. In upholding the amendment, the Court determined that the Glass-Steagall Act did not require separation between commercial and investment banking and indicated that absent
clear violation of congressional objectives, it would defer to the considered
judgment of the FRB in matters affecting the banking industry. Decisions of
this nature affect the structure and operation of the nation's financial markets
by providing greater flexibility for and competition between the entities that
compose the financial markets. This, in turn, affects the national economy,
which relies heavily on an effective capital market structure to enhance the
currently anemic rate of capital formation. 8 With the Glass-Steagall Act receiving severe criticism for its inability to adapt to the changing financial community,9 the Supreme Court's decision provides additional support for those
who call for a complete revamping of the current regulatory structure.
To better understand the decision and its impact on the regulation of
financial markets, it is necessary to analyze the legislative history of the GlassSteagall Act and subsequent efforts by Congress and the courts to enforce it.
The enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 was one of the prophylactic
measures taken in reaction to the banking system's breakdown during the
Great Depression. While the liquidity crisis that induced the depression was
brought about by the culmination of several reinforcing influences within the
related to banking," did not exceed Board's statutory authority); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971) (Comptroller of the Currency's amendment to Regulation 9, allowing commercial banks to operate what were the equivalent of mutual funds, was a violation of the GlassSteagall Act); New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir 1977), cert.denied,435
U.S. 942 (1978) (whether automatic stock purchasing services offered by a national bank violated
the Glass-Steagall Act was a question that was not ripe for judicial scrutiny); Baker, Watts & Co.
v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp 247 (D.D.C. 1966), afdsub nom Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co.,
392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (commercial banks not permitted to underwrite state or municipal
revenue bonds).
6. Clark & Saunders, JudicialInterpretationof Glass-Steagall- The NeedJrLegislativeAction, 97 BANKINo LJ.721, 723-24 (1980). The Glass-Steaall Act separates the activities of commercial and investment banks. For a discussion of the basic provisions of the Act, see infra notes
19-25 and accompanying text.
7. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
8. Over the past decade the United States ranked last among major industrial nations in
productivity and in share of gross national product invested in expanding and upgrading the stock
of productive capital. See Bowen, How to Regain Our Competitive Edge, 103 FORTUNE, Mar. 9,
1981, at 74, 82; see also The Reindustrializationof America, Bus. WK., June 30, 1980, at 55.
9. The Senate Banking Securities Subcommittee and the SEC have expressed the need for a
comprehensive review of the Glass-Steagall Act. Clark & Saunders, Glass-SteagallRevised: The
Impact on Banks, CapitalMarkets, and the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811, 811-13 (1980).
Critics have questioned the Act's ability to protect the investing public in light of changes in the
composition of the financial markets and the introduction of new securities products since the
Act's inception. The crucial questions are whether protection is necessary and, ifso, what form of
protection best meets the needs of the public. See Karmel, Glass-Steagal" Some CriticalAR~lections, 97 BANKINo L. . 631 (1980).
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United States and international economies,10 the lack of control over practices
in the banking and securities industries was a major factor in bringing about
the stock market crash of 1929. These imprudent banking practices further
deflated what was already a decelerating economy. 1
After the stock market crash, public attention focused on the security affiliates of banks. A Senate committee concluded that stock market loans made
by banks played a major role in fueling the speculative excesses that contributed to the market's collapse. 12 At the heart of the problem was what one
investigator called "a shocking corruption in our banking system, a widespread repudiation of old-fashioned standards of honesty and fair dealing in
exploitation of the vicious
the creation and sale of securities, and a merciless
13
possibilities of intricate corporate chicanery."
Congressional investigators identified two serious problems that were
caused by the affiliation between the banking and securities industries: concentration of economic power and conflicts of interest.' 4 The danger inherent in
the concentration of economic power was realized during the Great Depression. Banks and security companies had become so interrelated that the stock
market collapse exerted great pressure on commercial banks, contributing to
an unprecedented number of bank failures. 15 The conflicts of interest problem
was twofold. First, public confidence in national banks was threatened by permitting banks to have security affiliates. The close identification between the
bank and its security affiliate had the potential either to lower confidence in
the bank or to decrease the speculative nature of the securities market in the
eyes of the public. 6 Second, self-interest pressured the banks to support the
17
market price of stocks in companies in which they had a financial stake.
Both of these problems were exacerbated and finally uncovered by the collapse of the stock market. Each fed off the 18other and the combination resulted
in the exploitation of "trusting" investors.
10. Problems in the international economic system, the structure of internal debts within the
United States, and overextension of credit in the real estate industry all contributed to the economic decline in the early 1930s. M. LEE, MACROECONOMICS: FLUCTUATIONS, GROWTH, AND
STABILITY 175-88 (5th ed. 1971).
11. Id at 172-73. For a general review of the events surrounding the stock market's collapse
in 1929, see J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (1954).
12. See M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 7

(1977).
13. F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 283 (1939). The author, Ferdinand Pecora, was

counsel to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency from 1933 to 1934. In this capacity he
conducted the Senate investigation into banking and stock market practices.
14. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630-34.
15. M. LEE, supra note 10, at 180-81.
16. SeeA,Resolution to Make a Complete Survey of the NationalandFederalReserveBanking

Systems: Hearingson S. Res. 71 Before the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency. 71st Cong.,
3d Sess. 999, 1063 (1931).

17. Id To protect securities issued by their securities affiliates, banks might be used as receptacles for unsuccessful securities issuances or be compelled to make undesirable loans to either the
security affiliate or the issuing company. Peach, The Security 4ffiliates of NationalBanks, in 58
JOHNS

HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE No. 3,

(1941).
18. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.

at 113-14
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The Glass-SteagaU Act of 193319 was designed to help cure these deficiencies in the financial markets by divorcing commercial banks from their secur-

ity affiliates. The three primary objectives of the Glass-Steagal Act were: "(1)
to restore public confidence in banking following the 1929 stock market crash

and the accompanying widespread bank failures; (2) to ensure and maintain
general economic stability by prohibiting unsound and imprudent bank in-

vestments; and (3) to forestall potential conflicts of interest between commer-

cial and investment banking operations." 20 To these ends, the four sections of

the Act limit commercial bank involvement in securities underwriting. Section 21 contains the basic restriction that prohibits any entity engaged in the
business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities from simultaneously engaging in commercial banking.2 1 Sections 20 and 32 prevent a
company from circumventing the basic prohibition by means of an affiliate or
an interlocking directorate. 22 Section 16 defines the types of securities-related

services that commercial banks are authorized to perform.23 These include an
agency function through which banks may buy and seU securities as an agent
for the account of a customer (but not for its own account), an investment
portfolio function that permits the bank to purchase selected investment securities for its own account, and the unrestricted24ability to deal in federal, state,
and municipal obligations for their accounts.
Despite the attempt by Congress to partition the financial community
through the Glass Steagall Act, the lure of higher revenues and greater liquid19. Although Glass-Steagall is often used synonymously in reference to the entire Banking
Act of 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act only encompasses the four sections within the Banking Act
that limit bank involvement in securities underwriting. See Clark & Saunders, supra note 6, at
725; infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
The importance of the Glass-Steagall Act's separation is evidenced by the Congressional exemption of commercial banks from most legislation regulating the securities markets. The Securities Act of 1933 excluded banks from provisions requiring registration of new securities.
Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 excluded banks from its statutory definitions of
"broker' and "dealer." In 1940, the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisors Act
excluded commercial banks from the definitions of "investment company" and "investment advisor." See R. POZEN, supra note 2, at 512.
20. Clark & Saunders, supra note 6, at 725.
21. The statutory language provides that it is unlawful:
[flor any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of
receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook,
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor ....
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1976).
22. Section 20 prohibits the use of affiliates to circumvent section 21. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976).
Due to the statutory definition of "affiliate," however, bank holding companies could avoid divestment of securities affiliates by not voting their bank subsidiary shares. A bank could own or
control less than a majority of the voting shares of the affiliate or less than 50% of the shares voted
for the election of directors and, under the statutory definition, avoid classification of the security
affiliate as an "affiliate." See 12 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1976); 450 U.S. at 69-70.
Section 32 prohibits affiliation between securities companies and banks by means of officers,
employees, partners, or interlocking directorates. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1976); see Clark & Saunders,
supra note 6, at 726-27.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see Clark & Saunders, supra note 6, at 727.
24. Id.
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ity has enticed commercial banks to enter certain aspects of the securities business.2-5 The initial means of circumventing the Act was through the use of
26
bank holding companies, which could easily escape the Act's coverage.

Congressional concern about the potential detrimental effects of bank holding
companies led to the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,27
which required bank holding companies with two or more banks to divest
themselves of their non-bank assets.2 A major exception to this requirement
allowed bank holding companies to retain or acquire companies of a financial,
fiduciary, or insurance nature that engage in activities determined by the FRB
to be "closely related to the business of banking or managing or controlling
banks."29
In 1970, amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act 30 gave the FRB
the ability to expand permissible bank holding company activities by deleting
the congressionally imposed requirement that an activity be of a financial,
fiduciary, or insurance nature and giving the FRB in section 4(c)(8) full discre-

tion to determine whether an activity is "so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 31 Congress
25. Enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act did not prevent bank entry into the securities industry. Roberta Karmel, a former Commissioner of the SEC, explained the situation as follows:
The Glass-Steagall Act did not totally ban commercial banks from the securities industry. Like so much New Deal lekislation, it was a reactive and pragmatic response to
specified perceived wrongs. The statute put restraints on certain banking activities,
rather than enunciating a broad philosophical rationale for dividing a formerly
homogeneous financial community into two subcultures. Since some of these restraints
are on potentially profitable activities, avoidance of statutory restrictions has been a
challenge for bankers and their lawyers.
Karmel, supra note 9, at 632.
During the 1960s banks began to offer a variety of investment services, includin; collectively
managed agency accounts, see infra notes 37 & 39, automatic investment services, dividend reinvestment plans, individual portfolio management services, advisory services to investment companies, and private placement services for customers. See Edwards, Bank and SecuritiesActivitles:
LegalandEconomic Perspectiveson the Glass-SteagallAct,in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIEs 273 (L. Goldberg & L. White, ed. 1979); Clark & Saunders,
supra note 6,at 724; Clark & Saunders, supra note 9; Note, The Legality ofBank-SponsoredInvestment Services, 84 YALE LJ.1477 (1975).
26. The Act was only applicable to bank holding companies that voted their shares in subsidiary banks and whose banks were members of the Federal Reserve System. See supra note 22.
27. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976).
29. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (amended
1970); infra notes 30-32.
30. Pub. L. No. 91-607, tit. I, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A)
(1976)). The main purpose of the amendments was to close a loophole by bringing one-bank
holding companies within the provisions of the Act. The FRB and the Comptroller of the Currency testified before Congress in favor of the one-bank definition when the original legislation
was passed in 1956. The Act did not conform to the FRB's position, however, until the amendments were passed. M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 12, at 10.

31. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976). In addition to removing the requirement that a company's
activities must be of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature, Congress also deleted the phrase
"closely related to the business of banking," [emphasis added] and replaced it with "closely related
to banking." This is consistent with Congress's intent to provide the banking industry with the
flexibility to expand into bank-related activities that pass muster with the FRB.See 450 U.S. at 76
n.58; M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 12, at 20.
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required the FRB to consider whether the benefits produced by the affiliate's
activities would outweigh possible adverse effects in making its determina-

tion.32 In effect, the legislative changes gave the FRB increased discretionary
power to make qualitative decisions concerning what types of services offered
by bank holding companies are best for the public and curtailed bank holding
company expansion into the investment banking industry without regulatory
approval from the FRB.
Another means by which banks could gain entry into the securities indus-

try was
through the expansion of trust activities into the area of investment
33
funds.

This occurred during the mid-1930s when bank trust departments

began to operate common trust funds. By merging the assets of several small
to medium-sized trust accounts into one investment fund, a bank could reduce
and provide a more diversified investment portfolio for
its administrative costs
34
those trust accounts.
The FRB eventually became concerned with the growth of common trust
funds and the use of this investment tool by national banks in their fiduciary
capacity. 35 Before the FRB could tighten regulations governing these funds,
however, the banking industry convinced Congress to place control of trust
functions with the Comptroller of the Currency. 3 6 The Comptroller immediately revised the rules governing collective investment of trust funds to permit
the use of managing agency accounts. 37 Managing agency accounts involve

32. As amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976) states:
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or managing
or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a
holding company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as
greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible
adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practice.
33. The common trust fund involved the merger of smaller trust accounts into one fund for
collective management. The practice gained popularity when the Revenue Act of 1936 provided
that all funds complying with the FRB's rules and regulations on the collective investment of trust
funds by national banks would be tax-exempt. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, 1708
(1936) (current version codified at 26 U.S.C. § 584). The FRB amended its bank trust department
rules in 1937 to permit national banks to operate common trust funds when they were in furtherance of "bona fide fiduciary purposes." See Lybecker, Bank-SponsoredInvestment Management
Services: Consideration of the Regulatory Problems, and Suggested Legislative and Statutory Responses, 1977 DuK L.J. 983, 988-94; Note, The Common Trust FundStatutes-A Legalization of
Commingling, 37 COLuM. L. Rav. 1384 (1937).
34. See Lybecker, supra note 33, at 988-89; Note, supra note 33, at:1384.
35. In 1960 the FRB proposed tightening regulations governing common trust funds in response to bank utilization of common trust funds as a vehicle to provide customers the opportunity to invest in risk securities. See Lybecker, Bank-SponsoredInvestment Management Services:
A LegalHistoryand StatutoryInterpretiveAnalysis (pt. 1), 5 SEc. REG. L.J. 110, 151-52 (1977); see
also Judd, Common Trust Funds Under New Regulation 9, 102 TR. & EsT. 569, 570 (1963).
36. The banking industry was strongly opposed to the FRB's proposed limitations on common trust fund activities. The industry initiated a massive campaign to place the regulatory control of trust activities into friendlier hands. See Lybecker, supra note 35.
37. The Comptroller amended existing trust regulations in 1963 to include the pooling of
managing agency accounts as a fiduciary activity and deleted the corresponding requirement that
the bank and trust account must be for a bona fide fiduciary purpose. Amendment to Regulation
9,28 Fed. Reg. 3311 (1963) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1982)); see Saxon, New Trust Regulations
Proposed- Comptroller Outlines Tentative Rules on Bank FiduciaryPowers and Collective Investment Funds, 102 TR. & EsT. 95, 136-37 (1963).
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"investment advisory or investment management arrangements where something less than the usual trustee type relationship is created; they are the functional equivalent of investment advisory services provided by broker-dealers
or investment advisors."'38 By allowing these accounts to be pooled, the
Comptroller effectively permitted banks to operate mutual funds under the
guise of a trust service. 39 Since the operation of mutual funds is a significant
part of investment banking, this put commercial banks in direct competition
with investment banks. The timeliness of the Comptroller's action was perfect
for the commercial banking industry:
By the end of 1961, there were 511 common trust funds with assets
exceeding $3.5 billion, 48 F.R.B. 528 (May, 1962), and the first of the
modem "bull" markets was clearly getting underway. Thus, the collective investment management mechanisms were available and the
equity securities market was primed for delivering profits if the
banks could only get a larger share of the total investment management action. 4°
The Securities and Exchange Commission took a dim view of this
strategem. Despite the industry's contention that commingled managing
agency accounts were exempt from SEC regulation under the trust fund exclusion,4 1 the Commission considered the accounts to be a vehicle for public investment that required the protection of the federal securities laws. 42 After
nearly a decade of debate over this issue, the controversy was
settled by the
Supreme Court in Investment Company Institute v. Camp.43 In Camp the
Court held that sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited banks
from offering commingled managing agency accounts to the public. 44 Writing
for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that the Act clearly prohibited banks from
operating mutual funds.4 5 Characterizing commingled managing agency ac38. Lybecker, supra note 35, at 153-54.
39. Banks had long been permitted to operate managing agency accounts for their customers,
but not on a collective basis. When offered on a collective basis, the service becomes tantamount
to operating a mutual fund. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. By offering commingled
managing agency accounts as part of their trust services, banks attempted to avoid SEC regulation
of their activities. See Lybecker, supra note 33.
40. Lybecker, supra note 35, at 152-53 n.130.
41. The Investment Company Act of 1940 excluded common trust funds from its definition
of an investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1976). The primary reason for the exclusion
was the fiduciary nature of the fund and the desire to avoid duplication of supervision. Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on . 3580 Before the Subcom. on Securities and
Exchange of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 925-29
(1940).
42. See Common Trust Funds-Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm on Legal and Monetary Affairs ofthe House Comm on Government Opera.
tions, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. 3 & apps. BI-B19 (1963) (testimony of William Cary, Chairman, SEC);
see also SEC Legislation, 1963: Hearings on S.1642 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1963) (testimony of William
Cary, Chairman, SEC) (bank regulation is insufficient to protect investors).
43. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
44. Id. at 639; see also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
45. Justice Stewart observed that it was legal for a bank to act as a managing agent or to
commingle trust funds. Nevertheless, "the union of these powers gives birth to an investment
fund whose activities are of a different character." 401 U.S. at 625.

1983]

CONFLICT IN BAINKING

counts as mutual funds, Justice Stewart indicated that the differences between

these accounts and conventional open-end mutual funds were "subtle at best,"
and that the agency accounts were "in direct competition with the mutual fund
industry."'46
The FRB took the next step in the movement toward reuniting investment

and commercial banking through expansion of the bank holding company

concept. 4 7 On August 12, 1971, the FRB issued notice of its intentions to

amend Regulation Y4 by expanding the list of activities it considered to be
"closely related" to banking, thereby increasing the scope of bank holding
company activities. 49 The proposed amendment permitted bank holding companies to serve as investment advisors to the investment companies registered

under the Investment Company Act of 1940.50 In addition to managing the
investment company's portfolio, investment advisors usually sponsor, organize, and ultimately control the investment company. 5 1 Due to the intimate
relationship between investment companies and their advisors, strong opposition to the FRB proposal was voiced by the Department of Justice, which
claimed that allowing bank holding companies to serve as investment advisors

would be equivalent to permitting securities underwriting by banks. 52 The securities industry, another opponent of the amendment, argued that the proposed amendment was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Camp

by the combecause it opened the door to the "more subtle hazards" created
banking services. 53

mingling of investment and commercial
The FRB adopted the amendment, but subsequently narrowed its scope

in an interpretive ruling.5 4 The ruling identified the concerns of the Depart46. Id

The Court's decision was based on the definitional issue whether a commingled man-

aging agency account was a "security" as defined by the federal securities laws. Having determined that such an account is a security, the Court did not need to decide whether the operation
of a commingled managing agency account would be governed by the SEC, the Comptroller of
the Currency, or the FRB.
47. The FRB voiced dissatisfaction with the actions taken by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1963. See supra note 37; Lybecker, supra note 35, at 156-57. By employing the bank
holding company concept, however, the commercial bank was not directly involved in the securities transactions. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 1.
49. Section 225.4 of Regulation Y identifies specific activities in which a bank holding company or one of its affiliates may engage. These are activities that the FRB (pursuant to its authority under the Bank Holding Company Act) has determined to be "closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks." 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1982); see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 3.
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(e) (1982).
52. See Lybecker, Bank-SponsoredInvestment Management Services: A Legal History and
Statutory InterpretiveAnalysis (pt. 2), 5 SEc. REG. L.J. 195, 217 n.60 (1978).
53. Id; see also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text; 450 U.S. at 65.
54. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(a)(5)(ii), 225.125 (1982). In addition to the primary restriction that
limits bank holding company advisory activities to closed-end investment companies, see id
§ 225.125(0, the interpretive ruling stated that a bank holding company and its bank and nonbank
subsidiaries should not: (1) be readily identifiable with the investment company by name or location; (2) purchase securities of the investment company for their accounts, or in their sole discretion purchase such securities for a trust or managing agency account; (3) extend credit to the
investment company, or accept securities of the investment company as collateral for a loan that is
for the purpose of purchasing securities of the investment company; (4) engage directly or indi-
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ment of Justice and the securities industry, and concluded that the Glass-Steagall Act forbids a bank holding company from sponsoring, operating, or
controlling a mutual fund.5 5 The FRB stated, however, that the Act's restrictions were inapplicable to closed-end investment companies, which, unlike
or frequently engaged in the issuance, sale
mutual funds, "are not primarily
'5 6
and distribution of securities."
Dissatisfied with the FRB's interpretive ruling, the Investment Company
Institute (ICI), a trade association of mutual funds, petitioned the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals for a direct review of the amendment and the
accompanying interpretive ruling.5 7 The ICI charged that the FRB's action
was inconsistent with sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act and was
unauthorized by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.58 In vacating the
amendment, the court held that the FRB's action was not in violation of the
Company
Glass-Steagall Act, 59 but that section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
60
Act did not empower the FRB to authorize such activities.
The court reviewed the legislative history surrounding the Glass-Steagall
Act and determined that the policy underlying the Act required a complete
separation of investment and commercial banking.6 1 The court concluded
that since the Bank Holding Company Act was designed to prevent the banking industry from circumventing the Glass-Steagall Act by means of the bank
holding company, Congress did not intend to undermine the purpose of the
Act by authorizing the FRB to permit bank holding companies to operate security affiliates.

62

Upon review by the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, concluded that the amendment did not exceed the FRB's statutory authority since it was consistent with the Bank Holding Company Act, 63 was not
rectly in the sale or distribution of the investment company's securities; or (5) maintain excess
demand deposit balances in the investment company account, or invest cash funds of the investment company in a time deposit account. Id § 225.125(f)-(i).
55. Id § 225.125(f).
56. Id; see supra note 2.

57. The Investment Company Institute consists of 356 open-end investment companies, together with their 159 investment advisers and 120 principal underwriters. The ICI represents

almost 93% of the assets of domestic investment companies. Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 606 F.2d 1004, 1006 n.I (D.C. Cir. 1979).
58. Id at 1006. For a description of these provisions, see supra notes 21, 23 & 29-32 and

accompanying text.
59. The court concluded that a bank holding company with a security affiliate that operates
as an investment adviser to a closed-end investment company does not violate the Glass-Steagall
Act because the security affiliate does not perform commercial banking services and the bank
affiliate does not engage in investment services. 606 F.2d at 1011-14.
60. Id at 1015. See supra note 32.
61. Id at 1016.
62. In order to support the view that the objectives of the Glass-Steagal Act are incorporated

into the Bank Holding Company Act, the court stressed that "the effect of the Act as viewed by
later Congresses" was to divorce investment and commercial banking. Id at 1016 (emphasis in
original). The court inferred that Congress would have intended to prohibit a bank holding com-

pany from operating a closed-end investment company under the limitations imposed by the
FRB's interpretive ruling, but the court failed to review the implications of the FRB's limitations.
Id at 1016 n.30 and accompanying text.

63. 450 U.S. at 76-77; see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act,6 4 and, through the interpretive ruling,
avoided the potential hazards that association between bank affiliates and investment companies could create. 65 The Supreme Court looked beyond the
statutory language to discern the rationale behind the enactment of both the
Glass-Steagail and Bank Holding Company Acts. In applying the legislative
history of the acts to the situation presented, the Court's main concern was
whether the public would be66 effectively protected against the abuses that
brought about the legislation.
The Court initially noted that investment advisory services were not significantly different from the fiduciary functions traditionally performed by
banks. 67 This supported the premise that the service was an activity closely
related to banking under section 4(c)(8). Further strengthening the FRB's position, the Court stated that the FRB's determination of closely related activities was "entitled to the greatest deference," because the authority for a
specific activity must be preceded by the FRB's determination that the requested relationship can be expected to provide benefits to the public. 68 The
Court then determined that banking practices, the deference afforded to the
FRB, and a normal reading of the statutory language led to the conclusion
that the amendment did not violate the Bank Holding Company Act. 69 In its
review of possible Glass-Steagall Act violations, the Court held that a bank's
activities as an investment advisor do not necessarily violate sections 16 and 21
of the Act. Even assuming that they did, the Court decided that the activities
bank affiliates are not as
were allowable within the present context because
70
limited in their activities as banks themselves.
The Court reviewed the legislative history of section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act,7 1 on which the court of appeals rested its opinion, and
found no evidence that the 1956 Act and the 1970 amendments were "intended to effect a more complete separation between commercial and investment banking than the separation that the Glass-Steagall Act had achieved
64. 450 U.S. at 64-65; see infra note 70 and accompanying text.

65. 450 U.S. at 66; see supra notes 14-17 & 54 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 12-17 & 25-27 and accompanying text.
67. The Court noted that "[tihe principal activity of an investment advisor is to manage the
investment portfolio of its advisee--4o invest and reinvest the funds of the client." In their capacity as executors, trustees, or managing agents, banks have performed this activity for over a century. 450 U.S. at 55.
68. Id at 56-57. The Court quoted from the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in Board
of Governors ofthe FederalReserve System v.Agnew, which indicated another reason for deferring
to the FRB's judgment:
Their specialized experience gives them an advantage judges cannot possibly have, not
only in dealing with the problems raised by the system's workings, but also in ascertaining the meaning Congress had in mind in prescribing the standards by which they should
only
where
such
mattersthey
should
by overturned
thereit.is Accordingly
judgment
in it
administer
no reasonabletheir
basis
to sustain
or where
exercise
it in a manner
which learly exceeds their statutory authority.
U.S. 441, 450 (1947)).
69. Id at 56-58.
70. Id at 59-64.
71. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.

Id. at 56 n.21 (quoting 329
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with respect to banks in sections 16 and 21. '' 72 Unlike the lower court, the
Supreme Court failed to read into the Bank Holding Company Act a specific
limitation on the FRB's discretionary power regarding securities-related activities and concluded that the FRB's discretionary power to approve securitiesis not limited
related activities that it deems are "closely related to banking"
73
beyond the prohibitions outlined in the Glass-Steagall Act.
Despite its holding, the Court expressed continued concern for the separation of commercial and investment banking. The Court upheld its decision in
Camp by distinguishing the present case on the basis of the nature of the activities performed.74 In Camp banks were permitted to underwrite units of participation that were equivalent to securities; therefore, section 16 of the GlassSteagall Act was violated.7 5 In FRB v. IC!, however, the shares were of a
closed-end investment company, and although the shares did fall within the
definition of a "security," they were "not issued, sold or underwritten" by the
bank under the express prohibition of the interpretive ruling.76 By confirming
the Camp decicion in FRB v. ICI, the Court reaffirmed its interpretation of the
Glass-Steagall Act as prohibiting bank underwriting of securities. In doing so,
it identified its concern for protecting the investing public and the banking
system from the "danger of banks using bank assets in imprudent securities
investments." 77 The Court also implied that it would police activities that involve the "more subtle hazards of bank-security related functions. 78 This
would ensure that the improprieties which necessitated the Glass-Steagall Act
would be sufficiently controlled. 7 9
Recent rumblings from Congress and the current administration indicate
that the Glass-Steagall Act, and the separation of investment and commercial
banking that it achieved, may be legislatively dismantled. Currently under
Senate review is the Bank Holding Company Deregulation Act of 1982,80
which was introduced by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn.
The bill permits bank holding companies to form securities affiliates that oper72. 450 U.S. at 71. The Court determined that the Bank Holding Company Act was intended
to remedy the inadequacy of the Glass-Steagall Act in "seyering the connection between bank
holding companies and affiliates 'principally engaged' in the securties business." Id. This did not
support the lower court's proposition that § 4(c)(8) totally prohibited bank holding companies
from engaging in any securities-related activities, because "[investment advisors and investment

companies are not 'principally engaged' in the issuance or the underwriting of securities within the
meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act." Id; see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
73. 450 U.S. at 77.
74. Id at 64-68.
75. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 54.
77. 450 U.S. at 65-67.

78. Id at 66-67. These subtle hazards include undue reliance by the public on the bank
holding company's investment affiliate because of its relationship with the bank, loss of public
confidence in the bank, and conflicts of interest that are conducive to unsound banking practices
or to the inability to render disinterested investment advice. Id at 66-67 n.38; see supra notes 1417 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
80. S.2490, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Stanton of Ohio. H.R. 6720, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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ate mutual funds and underwrite government and municipal securities.8 1 The
Reagan administration has given its support to similar legislation and has indicated that such proposals are the first in a series of measures which will

amend banking laws that currently limit direct competition among banks,

thrift institutions, and securities firms.8 2 The SEC has also indicated its ap-

proval, stating that "Glass-Steagall concerns need not continue to stand in the
way of bank underwriting of municipal revenue bonds and money market
fund shares." 8 3 The SEC's position is based on the premise that flexible regulation through agencies will better serve the
public interest than the rigid bar84
riers that the Glass-Steagall Act imposes.
Underlying the current legislation is a need to make commercial banks
more competitive in the financial markets. The growth of money market
funds over the past five years has posed a serious threat to depository institutions by causing a significant shift of funds from low-interest deposit accounts
to higher paying instruments.8 5 Combined with this threat are the recent
81. The introduction to the bill states its purpose:
To authorize the formation of a bank securities affiliate to deal in, underwrite and
purchase government and municipal securities, to sponsor and manage investment companies and underwrite the securities thereof, to authorize bank holding companies to
engage in activities of a financial nature, insurance underwriting and brokerage, real
estate development or brokerage, to amend Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act and
for other purposes.
S. 2490, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
82. The Reagan Administration indicated its support of the Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981, S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See Bacon, Regan Outlines
Deregulation of.Banks, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1981, at 2, col. 2. This bill is a comprehensive piece of
legislation introduced by Senator Gan that would allow banks and savings and loan associations
to underwrite municipal revenue bonds and operate mutual funds. It would also loosen lending
restrictions on banks and savings and loans. See Pryor, FinancialLegislation PromptsLobbying
War: Bil'r Fate Rests with Lobbyists, Legal Times Wash., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29, col. 3.
83. FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) No. 937, at 7 (Oct. 28, 1981). The article summarizes statements
made by SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth. Commissioner Longstreth objected to the failure
of the 1981 bill to authorize bank regulatory agencies to establish standards for the entry of commercial banks into these areas of investment banking. Id at 8. The 1982 bill amends the Federal
Reserve.Act, permitting the FRB to establish regulations for security affiliates of bank holding
companies.
The first inroad in the area of deregulatory change was achieved on October 15, 1982, when
President Reagan signed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. The Act
offers remedial assistance to troubled and failing financial institutions by expanding FDIC and
FSLIC authority to provide direct and merger-related assistance to insured banks and savings
institutions. In addition, the Act directs the Depository Institution Deregulatory Committee to
create a new insured deposit account that will be competitive with money market funds. See
Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. - (1982).
84. Id at 7; see Karmel, supra note 9, at 633-39.
85. Money market funds were first offered in 1976. Since that time fund assets have increased to over $150 billion, with Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.'s $31 billion in money market fund
assets exceeding the total deposit base of Citicorp/Citibank, N.A. The real threat to banks lies in
the shifting of customer deposits to the more attractive money market funds. The funds, which
are not subject to Regulation Q's interest rate ceilings, see 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1982), are able to
provide a higher rate of return to their investors than traditional time deposit accounts or certificates of deposit. In addition, the cost of providing money market funds is substantially lower than
the cost of maintaining consumer deposit accounts. See Mulhern, Competition,Restriction Limit
Role of Commercial Banks, Legal Times Wash., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
Recent legislation has helped alleviate this threat by providing depository institutions with an
insured deposit account that will compete with existing money market funds. See Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, supra note 83.
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moves by nonregulated corporations into the securities industry 86 and investment banking into the commercial banking business. 87 These actions have
allgwed the commercial banks' competition to expand dramatically their services and to increase in number, while existing regulations have relegated banks
to the "bench."' 3 In light of these circumstances, only major revisions of the
statutory scheme will provide a satisfactory solution to the banking industry's
dilemma.
The proposed legislation indicates that if the Glass-Steagall Act is to be
discarded, a gradual approach will be taken in dismantling the barrier between commercial and investment banking.8 9 This phased approach will allow banks to concentrate their efforts on specific investment banking services
to determine whether they are profitable, feasible, and in line with corporate
strategy. Likewise, the amalgamation of the two industries would afford Congress and the regulatory agencies an opportunity to determine if the merchant
banking system utilized in Great Britain would be beneficial to the United
States economy. 90 More importantly, a phased approach to deregulation gives
the governing agencies time to develop and test a regulatory scheme that will
adequately protect the investing public prior to a full repeal of the Glass-Steagall ActY 1 Unfortunately, the current legislation has caused a great deal of
turmoil among the various financial institutions. Due to the lobbying strength
of these factions, the legislation will undoubtedly be slow in coming and will
involve a great deal of compromise.
FRB v. ICI afforded the Court an opportunity to interpret the legislative
86. Recently, several large corporations have moved into the investment banking area. Per-

haps the most threatening of these is the combination of American Express Co. and Shearson
Loeb Rhodes, Inc. (an investment banking firm), due to the wide variety of services that the new

corporation can offer. In addition, Prudential Insurance Co. of America has acquired Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., and Sears, Roebuck & Co. has announced that it will offer a mutual fund.
These moves indicate a trend toward the creation of 'near bank" conglomerates. Id at 30, cols. 14; at 36, coL 1.
87. Investment banking firms have been able to circumvent Glass-Steagall Act prohibitions
and provide checking account services (through a commercial bank) for their money market funds
or securities margin accounts. Securities firms have been even more direct in foreign markets by
acquiring or otherwise affiliating with foreign banks. See Edwards, supra note 25, at 274-75.
88. Besides being unable to offer competitive services, bank holding companies are delayed,
ifnot deterred, in their efforts to expand services by the approval process required under § 4(c)(8)
of the Bank Holding Company Act. See Mulhern, supra note 85, at 30, col. 3. Some participants
in the financial markets (the ICI in particular) believe that the role of banks in the financial system
precludes their entry into the securities field. See Fink, No Public Benefitsfrom Banks Entering
MuttualFundBusiness, Legal Times Wash., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
89. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan has indicated that the administration is concerned that
immediate full-scale deregulation would cause chaos within the financial markets. To avoid this,
the administration supports a gradual phasing in of bank involvement in the securities industry.
Bacon, supra note 82; see Pryor, supra note 82, at 36, col 4.
90. Merchant banking involves amalgamating commercial and investment banking into one
homogeneous financial system. For a discussion of how merchant banking would work in the
United States, see Merchant Banking-Isthe U.S. Readyfor It, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1976, at 54.
91. The merger of commercial and investment banking will require a concerted effort by the
SEC and FRB. One potential problem with developing a satisfactory regulatory structure will be
determining the responsibilities and jurisdiction of each agency. Currently there is no clear delineation in the proposed legislation of how duties will be divided. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
No. 937, at 7-8 (Oct. 28, 1981).
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objectives of both the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act.
In evaluating the legislative intent behind the statutes in the context of today's
financial markets, the Court determined that a complete separation between
commercial and investment banking was not required. The Court indicated
that it will defer to the Federal Reserve Board's judgment in matters concerning the banking industry unless the FRB's actions clearly violate the objectives
of congressional mandates. Given pending legislation and the flexibility it offers to regulatory agencies, the Court's decision means that the Federal Reserve Board may become unfettered in its ability to approve bank holding
company activities. This places the brunt of the responsibility for guarding the
public interest on the agencies that govern financial institutions and necessitates joint action by the FRB and SEC to ensure that deregulation of commercial and investment banking avoids the pitfalls experienced in the 1920s and
1930s. Given the competitive forces at play in the capital markets, this will
require an increasingly expansive definition of financial institutions and
securities.
ROBERT L. MENDENHALL

